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INTRODUCTION
“Children are the world’s most valuable resource and its best hope for the
future.”
-John F. Kennedy

More so than any preceding medium, the Internet has provided
users the ability to communicate quickly and without significant restric* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.A., Saint Joseph’s
University, 2008. The author would like to thank the editorial staff of the Notre Dame
Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy.
271

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE109.txt

272

unknown

Seq: 2

20-APR-15

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

14:49

[Vol. 29

tions. Today’s children face the challenge of seemingly mundane activities, part of everyday life, that have the potential to ruin futures. A
single status update on Facebook, post on Twitter, or video on YouTube
can have lasting ramifications. Minors are not the only population to
later experience post regret, but unlike politicians, athletes, or any
other adults, youthful indiscretion will often lead to less prudent and
thoughtful decision-making. Before nearly every person had an
Internet-capable camera in their pocket at all times, teenagers could
make mistakes, but would not have to wear a scarlet letter into adulthood. The rise of these devices and mobile applications create this risk,
which is further exacerbated by the rise of countless outlets, many of
whom fall victim to short shelf-lives of popularity, making potential laws
more difficult to properly tailor.
California recently enacted legislation to restrict advertising to
minors and provide them an “eraser button” to eliminate their online
presence. By regulating the Internet in this manner, SB 568 faces both
practical and legal difficulties that will not allow it to operate as
intended. Youthful indiscretion in the Internet era can have long-lasting ramifications, but it is not clear that there is yet a viable solution.
What is much more clear is that allowing the survival of laws like that of
California and its progeny will harm the free expression that has
allowed the Internet to flourish.
The purpose of this Note is to use SB 568 as an example of legislation aimed towards protecting children online, but which has the
potential to harm the proper functioning of the Internet. The first type
of shortcoming is discussed in Part I.B, which addresses its practical limitations, namely that it is not clear to whom it applies to and how large
the available safe harbor is. Part II frames the legal standards of
Internet regulation. Part III addresses the second type of deficiency
that SB 568 cannot survive, its legal flaws, primarily its possible invalidity
under the dormant Commerce Clause and First Amendment, and its
inability to exist within the current federal statutory framework.
The final part of this Note analyzes potential solutions to protect
children online. Though federal or even global legislation seems the
most attractive, it is not clear that a viable solution for shielding children from certain harmful advertising or erasing online content exists.
Viewing SB 568 from any perspective but a purposivist one must ultimately lead to the conclusion that Internet regulations in this manner
are fundamentally flawed.
I. “PRIVACY RIGHTS

FOR

CALIFORNIA MINORS

IN THE

DIGITAL WORLD”

A. Enactment and Purpose
California’s recent attempt to protect minors on the Internet was
through the passage of SB 568, entitled “Privacy Rights for California
Minors in the Digital World.”1 The bill contains two sections that
become operative on January 1, 2015. The first is an advertising law,
1.

2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 336 (S.B. 568) (West).
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which prohibits marketing of certain types of products to teenagers.2
The second section of the law has become colloquially known as the
“eraser law” and is aimed towards helping minors delete their online
presence.3
California’s purpose in enacting SB 568 was to fill what the legislature perceived to be a gap in protection for minors online.4 Federal
laws, namely the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”),
give children protection online, but only until the age of thirteen,5
while SB 568 expands its reach to all children under the age of eighteen.6 As the spread of the latest technology continues to increase, it is
often difficult for Congress to react quickly, and even more difficult to
determine what course of action to take.7 It was with a similar reaction—the recognized need to protect, but lack of clarity as to the best
manner—that Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 568 into law.8
The advertising law prohibits “[a]n operator of an Internet Web
site, online service, online application, or mobile application directed
to minors [from] market[ing] or advertis[ing]” a designated list of
products.9 It also applies to operators who have actual knowledge of
2. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580 (West 2014).
3. BUS. & PROF. § 22581. See Eric Goldman, California’s New ‘Online Eraser’ Law
Should Be Erased, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2013, 1:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
ericgoldman/2013/09/24/californias-new-online-eraser-law-should-be-erased.
4. S. JUDICIARY COMM., ANALYSIS OF S.B. NO. 568, 2013–14 Reg. Sess., at 4. (Cal.
2013).
5. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012). See
infra Part III.D.1.
6. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(d).
7. Privacy continues to be a right worthy of the utmost for many Americans, but
with regard to children and young adults, numerous issues have begun to coincide, such
as sexting, cyberbullying, online harassment, revenge porn. See Mary Ann Allison & Eric
Allison, Brains and Behavior: Addressing Amplified Adolescent Visibility in the Global Village, in
REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA: LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 89, 89–90 (Susan J.
Drucker & Gary Gumpert eds., 2013). Unintended consequences stemming from legislation will produce results that are nearly universally criticized, but the statute will remain
in effect and unchanged. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009)
(woman was unable to initially compel Yahoo! to remove indecent pictures posted of her
until she brought litigation, but had no further recourse against Yahoo! because of its
immunity under the Communications Decency Act—discussed in greater detail infra Part
III.C). Other laws, such as COPPA, are recognized by many to be helpful, but may not do
enough, or be too easy to circumvent. See infra Part III.D.1; Lauren A. Matecki, Note,
Update: COPPA is Ineffective Legislation! Next Steps for Protecting Youth Privacy Rights in the
Social Networking Era, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 369 (2010).
8. Though the bill passed through the California legislative process without much
difficulty, scholars and other commenters immediately expressed their thoughts. See
Goldman, supra note 3; Katy Waldman, California’s Internet Eraser Law: Nice Idea, But It
Won’t Work, SLATE (Sept. 25, 2013, 3:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/
2013/09/25/sb_568_california_digital_eraser_law_for_minors_is_unlikely_to_work.html.
Not surprisingly, children’s advocacy groups have hailed SB 568 as an “important milestone” because “[k]ids and teenagers often self-reveal before they self-reflect.” Somini
Sengupta, Sharing, With a Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/09/20/technology/bill-provides-reset-button-for-youngsters-online-posts
.html?_r=1&.
9. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(a), (i).
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use by minors and third parties.10 Among the list of products included
are items such as alcoholic beverages, firearms, tobacco products, “dangerous fireworks,” tattoos, tanning products, and catchalls for “obscene
matter” and “less lethal weapon[s].”11 Further, operators and third parties are prohibited from “knowingly” using, disclosing, or compiling
minors’ personal information for the marketing of the aforementioned
products.”12 Knowledge appears to be the critical component of the
law because of the safe harbor for “reasonable actions [taken] in good
faith.”13
The eraser component applies to the same operators, and requires
online services to: (1) permit minors to remove or request removal of
content or other information posted on the operator’s site;14 (2) provide notice to the minor that he or she is able to remove or request
removal of content or other information;15 (3) provide “clear instructions” for removal procedures;16 and (4) provide notice that the content removed will not be “complete or comprehensive” removal of all of
the minor’s content.17 There are several available exceptions to the
requirement by operators to allow removal including: if the minor
receives “compensation,”18 the content is anonymized,19 or if a third
party user “republished or reposted” the content.20 Even if an operator
is required to “erase” the content from visibility, it is not required to
remove the content from its servers.21
In conjunction, SB 568 hopes that the affirmative duties placed on
website and application operators and their advertisers will protect California minors’ privacy.22
10. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(c).
11. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(i).
12. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(c).
13. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(b)(2).
14. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(a)(1).
15. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(a)(2).
16. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(a)(3).
17. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(a)(4).
18. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(b)(5).
19. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(b)(3).
20. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(b)(2).
21. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(d)(1).
22. This is not the only legislation California has recently proposed to protect its
resident minors online. Senator Corbett introduced SB 501, entitled the “Social Networking Privacy Act.” 2013 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 336 (S.B. 501) (West). If passed, it would be
similar to the eraser law in that users under the age of 18 would be able to request
removal of personal information from a web site. However, unlike the eraser law, parents
would also be able to utilize SB 501 to request removal of their children’s posts. Another
key difference is that SB 501 applies to only certain specified types of personal information such as telephone number, home address, or credit card number. Once the minor
or a parent submits a request, the social networking site must commence removal within a
“timely manner” (defined as 96 hours). Willful or knowing non-compliance would
impose liability of $10,000 per violation, and was amended to explicitly exclude unintentional violations. Though SB 501 was passed by the California Senate, it has yet to be
voted upon by the Assembly or signed into law by Governor Brown. Expectedly, social
networking sites like Google and Facebook have opposed its passage because “timely manner” is unworkable and unfeasible. Patrick McGreevy, California Lawmaker Wants to Regulate Social Network Sites, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/apr/
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B. Practical Defects
On its face, SB 568 appears inconsistent at best. It stresses repeatedly that it should not be “construed to require an operator of an
Internet Web site, online service, online application, or mobile application to collect or retain age information about users” and a website
operator is deemed to be in compliance for good faith efforts to avoid
marketing the specified products to minors.23 Taken together, it is not
clear how wide this safe harbor is meant to be, and many questions
remain such as: would a website operator be deemed to have acted in
good faith if it asks for no information about its user and pleads ignorance? This obviously cannot be what the California legislature
intended, and the inherent conflict of the statute becomes apparent: if
a website operator attempts compliance, they necessarily will have to
collect more information about its user, namely whether they reside in
California and whether they are adults or minors.
The eraser law similarly has several practical defects. Since many
websites already afford their users the ability to delete posts, it is not
clear why this law was deemed to be a deserving recipient of the precious time and resources of the California legislature.24 However, even
if a website were to comply, it may nevertheless be ineffective because
minors may lie about their age in order to gain access.25 Also, if an
operator responded to the eraser law by deciding to ban minors from
its site entirely because it did not wish to comply, the problem would
likely be exacerbated.26
10/local/la-me-pc-social-networks-20130409. The larger issue that these sites and other
activists like the Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”) point to is that SB 501
infringes upon minors’ First Amendment rights through its use of third party requests for
removal. Emma J. Llansó, Policy Counsel, Center for Democracy and Technology, Statement before the California State Assembly Committee on Arts, Entertainment, Sports,
Tourism, and Internet Media, Comments on SB 501: The Social Networking Privacy Act
and SB 568, Regarding Privacy Rights for California Minors in the Digital World (June 25,
2013), available at https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-Testimony-SB501-SB568.pdf
[hereinafter Statement of Llansó]. Part of the problem is that this information is unverifiable, but even if it could be verified, it would most likely fall within a public record designation. A final issue with SB 501 is age verification, a problem discussed throughout this
Note. See infra Parts II.C and III.C. Though introduced the day before SB 568, the Social
Networking Privacy Act remains in committee, and given its potential weaknesses, its status remains in question.
23. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(g).
24. See, e.g., Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www
.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited May 21, 2014) (“You own all of the content and
information you post on Facebook, and you can control how it is shared through your
privacy and application settings. . . . When you delete IP content, it is deleted in a manner
similar to emptying the recycle bin on a computer. However, you understand that
removed content may persist in backup copies for a reasonable period of time (but will
not be available to others).”); Deleting a Tweet, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/
articles/18906 (last visited May 21, 2014) (article providing instructions for deleting
Tweets).
25. This is not an issue unique to SB 568, and is one of the primary reasons COPPA
is faulted. See infra Part III.C.2.
26. Statement of Llansó, supra note 22.
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Content eligible for removal is only that which is generated by the
minor, and does not include anything “republished” or “reposted.”27
The California Legislature included this provision to combat First
Amendment issues, but the exception likely swallows the entire rule and
is the most critical facial defect of the law.28 If a post were to go viral,
there is nothing SB 568 can do to protect the minor.29 This demonstrates why all eraser laws are doomed to fail. No matter the privacy
settings a minor may enable, the adage of “once it is on the Internet, it
is there forever” will still hold true, and no legislation will ever be as
effective as individuals making proper judgment calls regarding what to
post.30 President Barack Obama commented on the appropriateness of
this position while speaking to young students.31 The President discussed how he made many mistakes during his youth, but the problem
faced by teens today is that any post invariably “will be pulled up again
later somewhere in your life.”32 Though the California legislature
believed that teens will benefit from this law, there is a risk that they
may gain a false sense of security.33 This illusion of control does not
encourage the type of prudent behavior that should be exhibited
online by young people who will one day apply to colleges, jobs, or
perhaps even run for office. Likewise, the statute is facially unclear as
to whom it applies, whether it is something meant only for minors, or
for adults who wish to erase something posted while they were a
minor.34
27. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(b)(2).
28. Reposts and republishing is not limited only to sharing explicitly on the same
site. For example, screenshots of a particular post on Facebook could be posted to
another site like Twitter, CNN, etc.
29. The viral nature of the Internet acts as a double-edged sword. On one hand, a
positive message can quickly become popular and spread the word of a worthy cause. On
the other hand, social media blunders by teenagers will circulate just as quickly. Even if
SB 568 were upheld, viral stories would be out of the law’s province. E.g., Katy Waldman,
Teen’s Facebook Post Costs Her Dad $80,000. Oops., SLATE (Feb. 28, 2014, 1:41 PM), http://
www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/02/28/dana_snay_s_facebook_post_cost_80_000
_by_violating_confidentiality_agreement.html (teenager boasted about the private details
of her father’s lawsuit settlement, costing him $80,000); Steve Almasy, Kim Segal & John
Couwells, Sheriff: Taunting post leads to arrests in Rebecca Sedwick Bullying Death, CNN (Oct.
16, 2013, 8:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/15/justice/rebecca-sedwick-bullyingdeath-arrests/ (teenager posted on Facebook that she didn’t care that a girl she bullied
later killed herself).
30. California’s eraser law illustrates this point perfectly, because compliance
requires that posts be removed from the public eye, not from the web site operator’s
servers. Consequently, this can have legal implications and can still be used against the
minor.
31. Taylor Buley, When Social Media Bites, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2009, 6:00 PM), http://
www.forbes.com/2009/09/28/twitter-facebook-myspace-technology-personal-socialmedia.html.
32. Id.
33. See Goldman, supra note 3.
34. If the purpose of the law is to protect minors from harming their futures by
allowing them to delete posts that reflect that “[k]ids and teenagers often self-reveal
before they self-reflect,” it is not entirely clear whether this self-reflection would occur
before a person’s eighteenth birthday. See Sengupta, supra note 8.

R
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Another example of a significant lack in clarity is that minors who
have “received compensation or other consideration for providing the
content” are not eligible for the eraser button.35 Neither “compensation” nor “other consideration” is defined within the statute, and it is
not clear how broad the legislature intended this exception to be.36
Some commenters also fault the eraser law because certain online communities depend on users responding to one another, and requiring
deletion of this content could render posts nonsensical.37
II. LEGAL STANDARDS

OF

INTERNET REGULATION

The domain of law-making power over the Internet can be best
described as murky and implicates broad separation of powers questions. Regulation of the Internet undoubtedly belongs to Congress, but
questions remain as to state legislatures’ ability to enact laws to complement the existing federal framework. Even legislation that seems to
combat a significant societal issue will often be struck down by the
courts. The recent saga of Backpage.com illustrates challenges three
states faced in legislation targeted at the Internet.
The facts of each case are nearly identical, and involve a series of
state statutes attempting to criminalize the advertisement of sexual
abuse of a minor.38 Backpage.com is the operator of an online classified service, which experienced a rapid increase in growth after Craigslist Inc. ended its adult category of advertisements in 2010.39 Per
month, Backpage.com hosts approximately 3.3 million classified advertisements, blocks between 750,000 and one million posts deemed inappropriate under its terms of service, and reports 400 posts to the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.40 The state legislatures of Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey all wished to combat
human sex trafficking, specifically exploitation of minors, and enacted
35. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22581(b)(5) (West 2014).
36. A minor who operates a popular YouTube channel and receives advertising revenue would obviously fall outside the exception. A closer question would be a minor who
posts to be entered into a contest or receives a free trial to a subscription service. For
example, users on the music application Spotify will receive a free premium subscription
for a month if they share a link and another person signs up for the service—would this
be considered “other compensation?” SPOTIFY, http://spotify.extole.com/micro/
microsite (last visited May 21, 2014). The mobile application Foursquare allows its users
to check in at different mobile venues, some of which may provide a discount for the
check in such as a 10% discount from their bill or a free dessert—would this fall within
the definition of “other compensation?” Jeff Hidek, Check In On Foursquare; Check Out the
Benefits, STARNEWSONLINE (Nov. 22, 2012, 12:30 AM), http://www.starnewsonline.com/
article/20121122/ARTICLES/121129935.
37. See Goldman, supra note 3. However, a possible solution to this issue may exist
within the statute itself, as it allows the operator to comply through making identifying
information anonymous. BUS. & PROF. § 22581(b)(3).
38. Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012);
Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Backpage.com,
LLC v. Hoffman, 13-CV-03952(DMC)(JAD), 2013 WL 4502097 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013).
39. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 815; Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *1.
40. Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097 at *1; McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266; Cooper, 939
F. Supp. 2d at 813.
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similar laws.41 Each time, Backpage.com filed suit seeking injunctive
relief and the statute at issue was struck down, with no appeal sought.42
All three courts felt that the challenged statutes violated the dormant
Commerce Clause43 and First Amendment,44 and were preempted by
§ 230 of the Communications Decency Act.45
The three cases involving Backpage.com are fairly demonstrative of
the types of challenges to state regulation of the Internet. The remaining balance of Parts II and III will discuss the relevant law in each of
these areas and the implications that they may have on SB 568.
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The Framers of the Constitution understood that while state competition is important, Congress would retain the power to “regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States.”46 In Gibbons v. Ogden,47 Chief
Justice Marshall took a broad view of this power, recognizing that while
states undoubtedly possess the ability to regulate their internal affairs,
commerce is best defined as “intercourse between . . . parts of nations
. . . and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.”48 With this definition, the Commerce Clause serves as an independent limit on state regulation, even absent Congressional action.49
This implication of Congress’s power over commerce is referred to as
the “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court
has recognized that the “common thread” in cases involving this aspect
of the Commerce Clause is that “the State interfered with the natural
41. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 (Washington’s SB 6521 imposed liability
when a person “knowingly sells or offers to sell an advertisement that would appear to a
reasonable person to be for the purpose of engaging in what would be commercial sexual
abuse of a minor, if occurring in this state.”); Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 817 (Tennessee’s
statute imposed liability when a person “knowingly sells or offers to sell an advertisement
that would appear to a reasonable person to be for the purpose of engaging in what
would be a commercial sex act . . . with a minor.”); Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *3
(New Jersey’s statute imposed liability for “advertising commercial sexual abuse of a
minor if: the person knowingly publishes, disseminates, or displays, or causes directly or
indirectly, to be published, disseminated, or displayed, any advertisement for a commercial sex act, which is to take place in this State and which includes the depiction of a
minor.”).
42. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 827; Hoffman, 2013
WL 4502097, at *11.
43. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1286; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 841; Hoffman, 2013
WL 4502097, at *12.
44. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1275; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 840; Hoffman, 2013
WL 4502097, at *7.
45. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 823; Hoffman, 2013
WL 4502097, at *6.
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16 (2005) (“The
Commerce Clause emerged as the Framers’ response to the central problem giving rise to
the Constitution itself: the absence of any federal commerce power under the Articles of
Confederation.”).
47. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 190 (1824).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 199–200 (“[W]hen a State proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to
Congress, and is doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.”).
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functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or
through burdensome regulation.”50
A court reviewing state legislation will utilize a two-step framework
for potential violations of the dormant Commerce Clause.51 First, the
court must look to whether out-of-staters are discriminated against.52 If
the statute discriminates unfairly, it is per se invalid.53 If the state law is
found to be nondiscriminatory, the court will next apply the Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test, looking towards the extraterritorial
effect of the legislation:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed
on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.54

The Supreme Court further clarified this test in Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., and instructs the reviewing court to determine “whether the
practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
boundaries of the State.”55
Unsurprisingly, the Internet has created unique challenges for
state legislatures who attempt to regulate it.56 The Second Circuit has
50. McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1720 (2013). See Healy v. Beer Inst., 491
U.S. 324, 335 (1989) (the Dormant Commerce Clause demonstrates “the Constitution’s
special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic union unfettered by
state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres”); see Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Dean, 202 F. Supp. 2d 300, 320 (D. Vt. 2002) (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy,
519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997)) (the “dormant implication of the Commerce Clause prohibits
state . . . regulation . . . that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce
and thereby ‘imped[es] free private trade in the national marketplace’ ”).
51. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
52. Id.; Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 789 (2001).
53. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
54. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
55. 491 U.S. at 336. The Court analyzed its previous jurisprudence in this area and
listed several propositions that emerged: (1) the Commerce Clause precludes application
of state law to commerce that “takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether
or not the commerce has effects within the state;” (2) state statutes that “directly control[ ] commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceed[ ] the inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority and [are] invalid regardless of whether the
statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature;” and (3) considering the
effect of the statute in light of “not only . . . the consequences of the statute itself, but also
by considering how the challenged statute may interact with legitimate regulatory regimes
of other states and what effect would arise if not one, but many or every State, adopted a
similar legislation.” Id.
56. See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citations omitted) (“The borderless world of the Internet raises profound questions concerning the relationship among the several states and the relationship of the federal
government to each state, questions that go to the heart of ‘our federalism.’ ”).
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remarked, “[b]ecause the Internet does not recognize geographical
boundaries, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a state to regulate
Internet activities without ‘project[ing] its legislation into other
States.’ ”57 Considered by many scholars as the seminal case interpreting the dormant Commerce Clause’s interaction with state regulation
of the Internet, American Libraries Association v. Pataki found a New York
statute to conflict with Congress’s power under the tests articulated in
Pike and Healy.58 The Court’s reasoning focused on three concerns
regarding the statute: (1) it “project[ed] its law into other states whose
citizens use the Net”;59 (2) it imposed burdens on interstate commerce
that exceeded local benefit; and (3) “the Internet is one of those areas
of commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to protect
users from inconsistent legislation that . . . could paralyze development
of the Internet altogether.”60 While Judge Preska’s view seems to imply
regulation of the Internet belongs solely to the federal government,
subsequent cases split between a similar view,61 and one more restrictive.62 An important distinction to draw between these two lines of
cases is that as a general matter, statutes are more likely to be upheld if
aimed to combat luring a child for a sexual act, fraud, or spam.63
B. First Amendment
The First Amendment to the Constitution states that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
57. Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).
58. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 167.
59. Id. at 177.
60. Id. at 169.
61. See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2004) (accepting
adoption of Pataki’s rationale); Dean, 342 F.3d at 96 (invalidating a Vermont statute that
prohibited the transmission of sexually explicit materials to minors on First Amendment
and Dormant Commerce Clause grounds); ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1162 (10th
Cir. 1999) (recognizing that while protecting minors from sexually explicit material on
the Internet is an important interest, the statute at hand was an “invalid indirect regulation of interstate commerce”); TelTech Sys., Inc. v. Barbour, 866 F. Supp. 2d 571, 577
(S.D. Miss. 2011) (striking down Mississippi law after applying Healy because while the law
did not attempt to “directly control” commerce “wholly outside” the state, the practical
effect did just that).
62. See Am. Booksellers Found. for Free Expression v. Strickland, 512 F. Supp. 2d
1082, 1105 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“this Court will not adopt Pataki’s stance that all regulation
of the internet is the exclusive province of the federal government”), rev’d on other grounds,
601 F.3d 622; State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404 (Wash. 2001) (Washington Supreme Court
upheld state spam law by distinguishing Pataki because the statute did not regulate all
communications on the Internet; instead, it regulated emails sent from Washington or
directly to residents of Washington), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 997 (2001); MaryCLE, LLC v.
First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818, 842 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (upholding
Maryland law nearly identical to that of Washington because it “addresses the conduct of
spammers in targeting [Maryland] consumers”).
63. Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 52, at 787. See Simmons v. State, 944 So. 2d 317,
334 (Fla. 2006) (upholding conviction under Florida statute for luring or enticing a child
by means of online services and transmission of materials harmful to a minor; the Court
gave an in-depth analysis of previous cases that fall on either the Pataki or Heckel spectrum). Cf. State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431, 438 (N.D. 2003); State v. Ebert, 263 P.3d
918 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011); People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 189 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).

R
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press.”64 Through the Fourteenth Amendment, this prohibition
extends to the several States.65 A court will uphold a statute when
reviewing a facial challenge if a “readily susceptible” narrowing construction is available.66
If the speech subject to regulation is deemed commercial, the fourpart analysis articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v.
Public Service Commission of New York67 will apply.68 This analysis
includes: “(1) whether the expression concerns lawful activity and is not
misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental
interest asserted; and (4) whether the regulation is no more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.”69 Unlike strict scrutiny, the
Central Hudson level of intermediate scrutiny does not require the least
restrictive means.70 Rather, there must be a proper fit between the legislature’s ends and means chosen.71 This analysis has done a great
amount of work in tobacco cases attempting to limit minors’ exposure
to advertisements.72
Similarly, in the Internet context, the Supreme Court has been
unfavorable to content-based restrictions, even if aimed towards the
protection of children.73 Long-standing precedent recognizes the First
Amendment rights of minors, “and only in relatively narrow and welldefined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of
protected materials to them.”74 More recently, a California statute
prohibiting the sale of violent video games was found to be invalid
under the First Amendment.75 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
acknowledged that a State may have “legitimate power to protect children from harm” but it “does not include a free-floating power to
restrict the ideas to which children may be exposed.”76
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
66. Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (further,
“[t]he key to application of this principle is that the statute must be ‘readily susceptible’
to the limitation” because a court “will not rewrite a state law to conform it to constitutional requirements”).
67. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
68. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55 (2001).
69. Rockwood v. City of Burlington, 21 F. Supp. 2d 411, 421 (D. Vt. 1998); accord
Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555.
70. Minority Television Project, Inc. v. FCC, 736 F.3d 1192, 1204 (9th Cir. 2013).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Lorillard, 533 U.S. 525 (striking down Massachusetts statute banning
outdoor cigarette advertisements).
73. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
74. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213–14 (1975) (also stating,
“[s]peech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them”).
75. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
76. Id. at 2736.
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Typically tied to the breadth challenge, a statute may also not pass
constitutional muster under the First Amendment for vagueness.77
While “perfect clarity and precise guidance” is not required,78 prohibitions must be clearly defined.79
C. Supremacy Clause
1. Communications Decency Act
Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(“CDA”) with two purposes: first, to regulate indecency on the Internet
by imposing criminal penalties for the transmission of patently offensive content to minors,80 and second, to allow the Internet to continue
to evolve “with a minimum of government regulation”81 by declining to
extend liability to interactive computer services for content created and
developed by third parties through § 230.82 Taken together, the CDA
was meant to “encourage interactive computer services and users of
such services to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material, so as to aid parents in limiting their children’s access to
such material.”83 Therefore, the goal is to protect minors, but not
overly burden the free flow of expression on the Internet.84
An early challenge to the CDA struck down provisions located
within, when the Supreme Court found them to abridge the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment.85 These provisions were
aimed towards the promotion of the first purpose, decency on the
Internet.86 The Court ruled that as a medium, the Internet was different than radio,87 magazines,88 or adult theatres.89 Justice Stevens
faulted the CDA for the lack of precision required by the First Amend77. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). See also United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (“What renders a statute vague is not the possibility
that it will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.”).
78. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989).
79. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
80. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (West 1998).
81. Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc., 2002 WL 31844907, at *2 (E.D. La.
Dec. 17, 2002).
82. 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 2012) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.”). Absent this statute, a website operator would be
liable for defamatory or other speech, even if the operator was unaware of the statement,
e.g. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995). Congress enacted section 230 of this statute to specifically overrule Stratton
Oakmont. See S. REP. NO. 104-230, at 194 (1996).
83. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); 141 CONG. REC. H8469-70
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statements of Representatives Cox, Wyden, and Barton).
84. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1028.
85. Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
86. Id. at 868.
87. E.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
88. E.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
89. E.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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ment because it suppressed “a large amount of speech that adults have
a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.”90
Despite much of the CDA having been invalidated, § 230’s express
bar against liability in certain contexts91 was left for another day.92
Which ultimately came in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.,93 where the bar
was upheld when the court deferred to the policy choice by Congress
“not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for
other parties’ potentially injurious messages.”94 A website operator is
immune under § 230 if the content at issue was generated by a third
party user95 or if the action was by a third party advertiser.96
Though § 230 may preempt certain state laws, it was not Congress’s
intent to preempt all state law causes of action for interactive computer
services.97 The Ninth Circuit identified that the critical aspect to determine preemption by § 230 is whether the cause of action inherently
requires the court to treat the defendant as the “publisher or speaker”
of content provided by another.98 Immunity requires establishing
three elements: (1) the party “is a provider of an ‘interactive computer
service;’ (2) that the asserted claims treat the [operator] as the publisher or speaker of the information; and (3) the information is provided by another” party.99
Many recognize the need for facilitation of information on the
Internet, but will fault § 230 for the “strip[ping] of some of the legal
tools the law might otherwise offer harassment victims.”100 Professor
Bartow points to immunity being explicitly reserved for ISPs, but not
obligating them to disclose the third party content creator, often leaving victims with no possible recourse against wrongdoers.101
90. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874–75 (recognizing that while there is a governmental interest in shielding children from harmful material, it “does not justify an unnecessarily
broad suppression of speech addressed to adults”).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”).
92. Reno, 521 U.S. at 889 n.24.
93. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
94. Id. at 330–31.
95. See e.g., Diemo v. Max, 433 F. Supp. 2d 523 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (declining to extend
liability to website owner for comments posted on message board), aff’d 248 F. App’x 280
(3d Cir. 2007).
96. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google Inc., 732 F. Supp. 2d 628, 633 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(granting Google immunity from “fraudulent and abusive conduct of third part[y]”
advertisers).
97. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124 (E.D. Va.1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327
(4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
98. Barnes, 570 F.3d 1096.
99. Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 838 (3d Cir. 2007).
100. Ann Bartow, Bad Samaritanisn: Barnes v. Yahoo! And Section 230 ISP Immunity,
in CYBERSPACE LAW: CENSORSHIP AND REGULATION OF THE INTERNET 161, 162 (Hannibal
Travis ed., 2013).
101. Id. at 175.
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2. Federal Children’s Privacy Laws
a. COPPA and DNTK
The anonymity of the Internet provides great benefits in certain
cases, but Congress has realized the unique danger it can provide to
children in its passage of COPPA.102 “The primary goal of COPPA is to
place parents in control over what information is collected from their
young children online.”103 “Children” are defined as an individual
under the age of thirteen.104
COPPA was designed to ensure that website operators who direct
content at children or general websites that collect personal information from children had proper guidelines.105 These guidelines include:
notice of what information is collected, how it is used, and the website’s
disclosure practices.106 If the user is a child, verifiable parental consent
is also required.107 Examples of information that can trigger COPPA
include first or last name, physical or email address, telephone number,
and social security number.108
As the agency that administers the statute, the FTC reviews the enabling rule every five years.109 In 2012, the FTC amended the rule to
include geolocation information, photos or videos containing a child’s
image or audio files with a child’s voice, screen or user names, and
persistent identifiers.110 The amended rules also clarified that operators of certain “online services” include “any service available over the
Internet, or that connects to the Internet or a wide-area network.”111
These recent amendments indicate the broad view the FTC has taken in
enforcing COPPA.112
Though the protection of children’s information is widely
accepted as an important purpose, COPPA is not without its critics. For
example, it may be seen as inefficient because children are able to
102. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–06 (2006); see AARON SCHWABACH, INTERNET AND THE LAW:
TECHNOLOGY, SOCIETY, AND COMPROMISES 40 (2005).
103. Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FTC, http://www.business.ftc
.gov/documents/0493-Complying-with-COPPA-Frequently-Asked-Questions (July 16,
2014) [hereinafter COPPA FAQ].
104. § 6501(1). This distinction is important because minors who are above age 13
are only federally protected by general unfair or deceptive practice restrictions of the FTC
Act.
105. THOMAS J. SHAW, CHILDREN AND THE INTERNET: A GLOBAL GUIDE FOR LAWYERS
AND PARENTS 114 (2012).
106. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i).
107. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii).
108. AARON SCHWABACH, INTERNET AND THE LAW: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIETY, AND COMPROMISES 40 (2005).
109. SHAW, supra note 105, at 115.
110. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2012). See Shaw,
supra note 105, at 115.
111. COPPA FAQ, supra note 103.
112. See ANDREW B. SERWIN, PETER F. MCLAUGHLIN & JOHN P. TOMASZEWSKI, PRIVACY,
SECURITY AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 35, 40–43 (2011) (even prior to
the recent amendment, the FTC brought enforcement actions against many large and
well-known companies including Hershey Food Corporation, Xanga.com, and Sony).

R
R
R
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input false information to circumvent parental consent.113 Others
point to the cost of compliance, which, in turn, leads to websites or
other online services banning or declining to produce content for users
who are children.114 Perhaps the most visible critic of COPPA is
Facebook founder and Chief Executive Officer Mark Zuckerberg, who
sees the age limit of thirteen as a restriction that will be challenged by
Facebook in the future.115
Related to COPPA and the FTC’s growing concern for teenagers,116 the Do Not Track Kids Act of 2013 (“DNTK”) was introduced in
both the House and Senate.117 The Act includes several key provisions
such as an eraser button, opt-ins for behavioral marketing, and collection of information, limiting the amount of information that companies
can collect and retain, and reinforcing COPPA’s 2012 amendments.118
Instead of COPPA’s line of protection set at twelve and under, DNTK
applies to children fifteen and under.119 Critics of DNTK fault its use
of fifteen as too arbitrary and confusing, both for users and operators,
because the distinction between sites aimed at teenagers and children is
much more clear than aimed at various subsets of teenagers.120
b. CIPA & Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act
The Children’s Internet Protection Act (“CIPA”)121 reflects Congress’s concerns regarding children’s ability to access harmful or offensive content on the Internet. Schools or libraries that receive discounts
or funding under the E-Rate plan for Internet connections must certify
that they have an Internet safety policy that includes technology protection measures.122 Schools or libraries subject to CIPA must “monitor
the online activities of minors” to remain in compliance.123 To avoid
constitutional difficulties, CIPA also requires that adults may disable the
content filtering for any lawful purpose.124 Further, the Protecting
Children in the 21st Century Act provides that these schools and libraries must educate minors on “appropriate online behavior, including
113. IAN BROWN & CHRISTOPHER T. MARSDEN, REGULATING CODE: GOOD GOVERNAND BETTER REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 121 (2013) (“In reality, children
circumvent these restrictions by entering an inaccurate birthdate on the initial subscriber
information register.”).
114. See Matecki supra note 7, at 370–71.
115. Michal Lev-Ram, Zuckerberg: Kids Under 13 Should be Allowed on Facebook, CNN
(May 20, 2011, 3:02 PM), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2011/05/20/zuckerberg-kidsunder-13-should-be-allowed-on-facebook/.
116. COPPA FAQ, supra note 103.
117. H.R. Res. 3481, 113th Cong. (2013); S. Res. 1700, 113th Cong. (2013).
118. See H.R. Res. 3481, supra note 117.
119. Id.
120. Emma Llansó, Do Not Track Kids Bill Revives Minors’ Online Privacy Debate, CDT
(Nov. 26, 2013), https://cdt.org/blog/do-not-track-kids-bill-revives-minors%E2%80%99online-privacy-debate/.
121. 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(h)(5), 254(I) (2012); 47 C.F.R. § 54.520(c)(1)(i) (2011).
122. § 254(h)(5).
123. § 254(h)(5)(B)(i).
124. 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(3) (2010); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(I) (2008).

ANCE
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interacting with other individuals on social networking websites . . .”125
CIPA was challenged by the American Library Association, and while
the District Court found that Congress had acted outside its power
granted by the Spending Clause,126 the Supreme Court reversed, finding that Congress did not impose unconstitutional conditions on public
libraries or violate the First Amendment.127
c. The Failed Dream of COPA
After the invalidation of several provisions of the CDA,128 and as a
precursor to COPPA, Congress attempted to pass a more narrowly tailored means by which to protect minors online with the Children’s
Online Privacy Act (“COPA”).129 COPA utilized both civil and criminal
penalties for anyone who knowingly posts “material harmful to minors
. . . for commercial purposes.”130 A motion requesting relief through
permanent injunction was immediately filed, and a decade long challenge commenced, ultimately leading to its invalidation.131 The court’s
analysis proceeded under strict scrutiny, finding COPA to be overbroad, unconstitutionally vague, and not the least restrictive means of
protecting transmission of harmful content to minors.132
III. LEGAL DEFECTS

OF

SB 568

A. Dormant Commerce Clause
As the trio of Backpage.com cases demonstrated, regulation of the
Internet undeniably belongs to Congress, but it is not exclusive.133 The
dormant Commerce Clause prevents states from enacting certain types
of legislation, and “[t]he Internet is undeniably an incident of interstate commerce.”134 A court reviewing SB 568 would first ask whether it
discriminates against out-of-staters.135 Neither the advertising law nor
the eraser law facially seem to discriminate, as they apply to any “operator of an Internet Web site . . . directed to minors,” regardless of the
operator’s location.136
The second step of the Pike analysis would ask the reviewing court
to balance the putative local benefits against the effect on interstate
commerce.137 A party challenging SB 568 would bear the burden of
125. 15 U.S.C. § 6551 (2008).
126. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
127. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
128. Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
129. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (West 1998).
130. Id.
131. ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1137
(2009) (discussing extensive procedural history).
132. Id. at 190.
133. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805; Hoffman, 2013 WL
4502097.
134. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184.
135. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
136. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580(a) (West 2014).
137. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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demonstrating that the practical effect burdened interstate commerce.138 Though a court applying this Pike analysis would defer to the
California legislature’s judgment,139 it would nevertheless have to conclude that SB 568 “further[s] the purpose so marginally, and interfere[s] with commerce so substantially [that it is] to be invalid under
the Commerce Clause.”140 The purpose of prohibiting the advertisement of certain products to teenagers, and allowing them to escape
social media transgressions is important, but so was restricting minors’
access to obscene material141 and criminalizing a sex act with a
minor,142 but both were struck down for their practical effects on interstate commerce.
Of the dormant Commerce Clause propositions that Healy noted,
two are applicable when evaluating this step of Pike: first, state statutes
which directly control wholly out-of-state commerce; and second, the
state statute’s interaction with legitimate regulatory schemes of other
states.143 This is ultimately where SB 568 fails.
Assuming arguendo that SB 568 could achieve its desired effects, the
prohibition on advertising and requirement of an eraser fall closer to
the Pataki line of cases than to Heckel.144 Though SB 568 explicitly limits its application to minors who reside in California, it also states “[t]his
section shall not be construed to require an operator of an Internet
Web site, online service, online application, or mobile application to
collect or retain age information about users.”145 Therefore, operators
are faced with three options: comply with SB 568’s advertising and
eraser provisions universally, ask for geographical and age information,146 or plead ignorance and hope to fall within the safe harbor provision.147 If a company chooses the latter, it is not clear whether this
138. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
139. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987).
140. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981).
141. See Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2003).
142. See Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805; Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097; McKenna, 881 F.
Supp. 2d 1262.
143. Healy, 491 U.S. at 336.
144. See supra notes 61–62. Further, the Heckel court’s analysis included that:
[U]nder the New York statute, a website creator in California could inadvertently violate the law simply because the site could be viewed in New York. . . . In
contrast to the New York statute, which could reach all content posted on the
Internet and therefore subject individuals to liability based on unintended
access, the Act reaches only those deceptive UCE messages directed to a Washington resident or initiated from a computer located in Washington; in other
words, the Act does not impose liability for messages that are merely routed
through Washington or that are read by a Washington resident who was not the
actual addressee.
Heckel, 24 P.3d at 412.
145. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580(g) (West 2014). Compliance is established “if
the operator takes reasonable actions in good faith” to achieve the purpose of the statute.
BUS. & PROF. § 22580(b)(2).
146. Which, as COPPA has demonstrated, can be easily faked.
147. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(b)(2).
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would qualify as “good faith” and fall within the safe harbor
provision.148
The most likely approach is compliance. However, without
requesting more information—such as location and age—SB 568 compliance would begin to regulate conduct wholly outside California’s
borders. This regulation of interstate commerce will certainly occur
even in the application to a minor who is a resident of California—for
example, if a user were to travel to another state and utilize a website or
mobile application. There is no limiting language in SB 568 to infer it
does not apply in this scenario. If the operator then advertised an
excluded product to a minor and California attempted to impose punishment, this is conduct wholly outside the state.
The remaining applicable Healy convention would be implicated if
SB 568 survived because a state patchwork would result.149 Some
believe that regulation of the Internet by states is per se invalid150
because unlike other areas of the law, a company may not choose to
market its site or application in a particular location, but under a state
patchwork it would be forced to comply with multiple states’ regulatory
schemes.151 The danger of regulations like SB 568 is that they set a
national floor, and website operators will comply with the most restric148. Factually, SB 568 is most similar to the statute at issue in Se. Booksellers Ass’n v.
McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d 773 (D.S.C. 2005). The limiting language located within the
eraser law instructs operators to not construe their obligations as to require collection of
more data; however, they would “have no way of ensuring their communications are not
accessed in a certain geographic location.” Id. at 787.
149. See Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The unique nature of the
Internet highlights the likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never
intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed. Typically, states’ jurisdictional limits are related to geography; geography, however, is a virtually meaningless
construct on the Internet. The menace of inconsistent state regulation invites analysis
under the Commerce Clause . . . because that clause represented the framers’ reaction to
overreaching by the individual states that might jeopardize the growth of the nation
. . . .”).
150. Id. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 3 (“My position is that states categorically lack
authority to regulate the Internet because the Internet is a borderless electronic network,
and websites/apps typically cannot make their electronic packets honor state borders.”).
151. For example, a company can decide what state to incorporate in, and is subject
to its laws under the internal affairs doctrine, which out-of-state courts have no choice but
to apply. Regulation of the Internet is different because no choice exists. Theoretically
an Internet or application operator could block all the residents of a state from accessing
its content, but it is likely to be costly and would not be effective because of the many ways
available to circumvent these types of restrictions. See Eric Goldman, The Implications of
Excluding State Crimes from 47 U.S.C. § 230’s Immunity, SANTA CLARA LAW DIGITAL COMMONS
6–7 (2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2287622.
(“Most [user-generated content] websites have no easy way to avoid interacting with
residents in any specific state, so even small websites typically have users in every state.”).
Perhaps the greatest evidence that these types of restrictions are not effective is that
Facebook was blocked in China when only 8 million Chinese Internet users used it, but it
now has over 60 million Chinese users. Douglas MacMillan, Facebook Rises as 63.5 Million
Users in China Skirt Ban, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 28, 2012, 4:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg
.com/news/2012-09-27/facebook-tops-63-million-users-in-china-despite-ban-report-says
.html.
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tive state in order to avoid liability in any state, disrupting power
between the states.152
Evidence of this danger was felt immediately. Within three months
of SB 568’s enactment, Maryland expressed a similar cause for concern
for its resident minors on the Internet and created a Workgroup on
Children’s Privacy to convene with its Office of the Attorney General to
produce a report (“Workgroup Report”).153 The Workgroup summarized its findings on the history and current state of children’s online
privacy.154 The report is troubling because it encourages the Maryland
legislature to enact legislation similar to SB 568.155 If Maryland and
other states follow suit, inconsistent or even conflicting regulations
could occur.156 In testimony before the California Assembly regarding
152. See Sengupta, supra note 8 (quoting Mali Friedman, attorney at Covington &
Burling, as saying “[o]ften you need to comply with the most restrictive state as a practical
matter because the Internet doesn’t really have state boundaries”). Professor Goldman
further argues that the two justifications of federalism and letting states manage their own
affairs (legislative experimentation and being better situated to respond to state-specific
conditions) cannot hold true in regulation of the Internet, and the potential adverse
consequences that would occur otherwise are too great. Goldman, supra note 151. The
former justification of state experimentation led to the regulatory “race to the bottom”
where Delaware emerged as dominant force in corporate law, which cannot be the case
for children’s online privacy; it is unthinkable that a state would introduce legislation to
lower the protections of its minors.
153. STATE OF MD. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., REPORT OF THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE
PRIVACY 1 (2013) (the Workgroup was required to examine and issue its report on six
issues regarding children’s Internet privacy: including online advertising aimed towards
children, current and forthcoming federal and state regulations, and best practices used
by the Internet industry).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 33.
156. Id. Maryland’s brief analysis of the issues regarding the enactment of legislation modeled after SB 568 was woefully inadequate. For example, a member expressed
that § 230 conflicts with any potential state-enacted eraser laws. The Workgroup incorrectly interpreted § 230’s central purpose and most important section. The central purpose is to immunize website operators, but not against taking down content—it is for
content posted by third parties that is not removed, meaning the eraser law has very little
to do with § 230, unless a state sought to impose a penalty for non-compliance. See e.g.,
Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc. 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008) (finding no liability
under § 230 where website operators honored a removal request depicting the plaintiff
that was created by a third party, but the information was posted elsewhere). The biggest
issue with the Workgroup’s § 230 analysis is regarding a proposed advertising law.
Though acknowledging that its suggestion was adoption of an advertising provision like
SB 568, the report does not acknowledge that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this
section.” Holding website operators liable under an advertising law is clearly in conflict
with § 230’s goal of immunity. See supra Part III.C.1.
The Workgroup’s analysis of the patchwork problem is best described as dismissive,
relying on states’ status as “innovators” who go “above and beyond the protections offered
by federal laws,” that states can pass legislation that mirrors other states, and that data
breach notifications are subject to state laws “and that system is working well.” Id. at 33.
Regulation of the Internet is not the proper forum for states to be “innovators” because of
its inherent borderless nature. While states can mirror each other, they are under no
obligation to do so, and contrary to the Workgroup’s characterization of data breach
notifications, it is an area plagued by inconsistencies regarding shareholder derivative
suits, consumer liability, and civil liability. See Reid J. Schar & Kathleen W. Gibbons, Complicated Compliance: State Data Breach Notification Laws, BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 9, 2013),
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SB 568 and SB 501,157 the Center for Democracy & Technology
(“CDT”) faulted the advertising law for its potential patchwork
consequences.158
Despite the importance of states’ autonomy and their ability to
serve as “laborator[ies]” to “try novel social and economic experiments,”159 broad Internet legislation by states does not serve any of the
justifications put forth for decentralized regulation.160 California does
have an interest in the protection of its children online, but it is no
different than those of Texas, New York, or Montana. There is no local
knowledge or condition that enables states to tailor online legislation to
local conditions. Without question, this type of legislation creates innovation, but that is precisely the problem. If Maryland decides California
is on the right track and passes a law that is similar, but not identical,
website operators must spend more on compliance. In this situation,
innovation is actually suppressed because incumbent operators may be
capable of bearing the increased financial burden, unlike potential
start-ups. While a site like Facebook may have the infrastructure, lobbyists, and other resources to track proposed legislation that may affect its
business model from around the country, new companies simply do
not, or do not consider it.161 Even larger and more established sites
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/complicated-compliancestate-data-breach-notification-laws/. Support for a uniform federal approach to data
breach law has increased, and now has support from President Obama, United States
Attorney General Eric Holder, and on both sides of the aisle in the Senate. Some members of Congress have even suggested that additional legislation is not required and that
the FTC could bring data breaches within its purview through its broad rulemaking
power. Danielle Douglas, Here’s Why the Government Wants a National Data Breach Law,
WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/
2014/02/24/heres-why-the-government-wants-a-national-data-breach-law/.
157. See Statement of Llansó, supra note 22 for discussion of SB 501.
158. Id. For example, the CDT points to differing state laws regarding tanning and
the sale of aerosol paint to minors. While this is permissible because these states are
taking what they believe to be appropriate action, placing advertising bans on the
Internet would undoubtedly create a nightmare of compliance issues. Maryland is the
perfect example—it permits minors to tan, while California bans anyone under age 18. If
both states had Internet advertising law bans, a website operator would have to become
an expert on each state’s intricacies and collect more data about its users to be in compliance. The CDT also notes that even if the products can be advertised towards minors, it
does not change that they cannot actually purchase them.
159. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
160. The five recognized justifications are: (1) ability to leverage local knowledge
and expertise; (2) regulation better tailored to local conditions; (3) experimentation to
promote innovation; (4) social utility is maximized by allowing local communities to
shape its own goals; and (5) decision-makers are more accessible, making them more
accountable. Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D:
A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government Authority, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 19, 41
(2014).
161. Even the diligent start-up will face these issues. There are many online
research guides on how to comply with existing regulations, but when instructed to check
local law, these guides are usually referring to tax, employment, and entity formation
issues. See, e.g., Online Businesses, BUSINESSUSA, http://business.usa.gov/article/onlinebusinesses (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); Online Advertising Law, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, http://www.sba.gov/content/online-advertising-law (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
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may only have their finger on the pulse of federal legislation, but could
be subject to laws like SB 568, cutting against the traditional notion of
more accessible decision-makers.162 Simply put, states can pass
unsound Internet legislation that is not unique to their community with
the best-case scenario of effectively creating national law—a violation of
the dormant Commerce Clause—or the worst-case scenario of creating
a national patchwork of inconsistent or even conflicting regulations.
B. First Amendment
Even if SB 568 survived a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, it
fails on First Amendment grounds.163 The statute from Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association164 is remarkably similar in that “California’s legislation straddles the fence between (1) addressing a serious
social problem and (2) helping concerned parents control their children. Both ends are legitimate, but when they affect First Amendment
rights they must be pursued by means that are neither seriously underinclusive nor seriously overinclusive.”165 Though proponents of SB 568
point to the effect of modern technology and the need for law to protect minors, the principles of the First Amendment “do not vary when a
new and different medium for communication appears.”166 The
speech that SB 568 seeks to regulate is commercial speech, and therefore would be subjected to the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson’s
four-part test.167 California would bear the burden of demonstrating
that its speech restrictions were constitutionally valid.168
The first step of determining whether the “expression contains a
lawful activity” is clearly met. Advertisements are speech protected by
the First Amendment so long as they are not misleading or deceptive,
162. Admittedly, California is a large state home to many website operators and SB
568 created national headlines; however, they were after its passage, so even if an operator wished to voice an objection it would be too late. The fact that it was California that
passed this law should not matter. Any state could potentially pass an advertising and
eraser law, hijacking the national law. No solace should be found that SB 568 came from
the same state as Silicon Valley. For example, the New Jersey Senate introduced a similar
law several weeks after California, but the bill is now considered dead. Matt Friedman, A
Right to Delete? Bill Would Give N.J. Kids Option to Remove Regrettable Online Posts, NJ.COM
(Nov. 18, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/11/
a_right_to_delete_bill_would_require_kids_have_option_to_remove_regretable_online_
posts.html#incart_river.
163. See McMaster, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 782 (“Unfortunately for Defendants, the
Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court (as well as a wealth of other district courts) have
explicitly rejected age verification and labeling as effective means of achieving the state’s
ends of regulating harmful to minors speech on the Internet. . . . These courts have
unanimously concluded that these measures are far too burdensome, and chill adults’
ability to engage in, and garner access to, protected speech for a wealth of reasons.”).
164. 131 S. Ct. 2729.
165. Id. at 2741.
166. Id. at 2733.
167. See supra Part II.B.
168. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 816 (2000);
Ammari v. City of Los Angeles, 988 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (C.D. Cal. 2013).
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and “only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected materials to them.”169
The remaining steps—whether the governmental interest is substantial, whether the regulation advances the interest, and whether the
regulation is more expansive than necessary—favor SB 568 invalidation.
Protecting children from advertisements and allowing them to
erase portions of their online presence seem to be compelling interests,
but it is not evident whether SB 568 would directly advance this interest,170 especially because mere speculation is not sufficient.171 The
advertising provision is both underinclusive (minors would still be
exposed to similar advertisements in other media) and overinclusive (it
covers a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech).172
Without requesting more information from its users, operators would
hope to qualify for safe harbor of SB 568, or may become more selective
in choosing advertisers, which could “reduc[e] the adult population . . .
to . . . only what is fit for children” on those sites.173 The California
legislature’s lack of meaningful responses to critics of SB 568 also likely
demonstrates that the “costs and benefits associated with the burden on
speech imposed by the regulations” were not adequately analyzed.174
Advertising bans on goods may also be struck down for vagueness
when “they are so ambiguous that a reasonable person cannot tell what
expression is forbidden and what is allowed.”175 The question facing a
court would then be: is “directed to minors” too ambiguous? The
answer is unquestionably yes. Websites aimed at children twelve or
younger are much easier to classify than sites aimed towards those who
are seventeen or younger, making SB 568 different than COPPA.176
The California legislature did not provide proper guidance as to when a
site is “directed to minors,” leaving operators unsure as to how to com169. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 212.
170. See supra Part I.B.
171. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 555.
172. Prohibiting the advertisement of these products on sites where there are both
adult and minor users does not justify regulation that advances a substantial state interest.
Cf. Educ. Media Co. at Virginia Tech, Inc. v. Insley, 731 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2013) (striking
down ban on alcohol advertisements for college newspapers even though there was an
interest in curtailing underage drinking because it prohibited large numbers of those
who were able to legally consume alcohol from receiving truthful information).
173. Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 (citation omitted).
174. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 561 (internal quotation marks omitted).
175. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1278–79 (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566,
569 (1974)).
176. In enforcing COPPA, the FTC has identified factors as to whether a website is
“directed to children.” Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.2
(2012) (“In determining whether a commercial website or online service, or a portion
thereof, is targeted to children, the Commission will consider its subject matter, visual or
audio content, age of models, language or other characteristics of the website or online
service, as well as whether advertising promoting or appearing on the website or online
service is directed to children. The Commission will also consider competent and reliable
empirical evidence regarding audience composition; evidence regarding the intended
audience; and whether a site uses animated characters and/or child-oriented activities
and incentives.”). See also Statement of Llansó, supra note 22.
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ply.177 Like COPA, SB 568 seeks to restrict content available to minors
online, but it is to the detriment of adults.178 Conversely, the lack of
precision contained in the statute’s text removes any effectiveness it
may have.179
Advertisements are considered commercial speech, thus are
offered protection under the First Amendment. While they are
reviewed under intermediate instead of strict scrutiny, restrictions on
the free expression of speech on the Internet have been repeatedly
struck down, like SB 568 should be.
C. Preemption
There are a number of ways to analyze possible preemption of SB
568. Federalism recognizes that both national and state governments
are sovereign entities.180 The Supremacy Clause requires that the federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”181 Federal preemption of
state law can occur in three circumstances: explicit enactment by Congress, conflict with federal law, or when federal law occupies an area to
such an extent, it would be reasonable to conclude that there is no
room for state legislation in the area.182 In California’s enactment of
SB 568, it is likely preempted in the first and second manner by § 230 of
the CDA, and in the third manner by the dormant Commerce Clause
and the current regulatory landscape of protecting children online.
1. CDA Section 230
The definition183 of operators of websites, online services, online
applications, and mobile applications utilized by SB 568 is very broad
and closely resembles that of the CDA’s definition of “interactive computer service.”184 The biggest difference between the two is that SB 568
includes operators whose products are “directed to minors or who
ha[ve] actual knowledge that a minor” is using the products.185
177. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580(e) (West 2014) (“ ‘Internet Web site, online
service, online application, or mobile application directed to minors’ mean an Internet
Web site, online service, online application, or mobile application, or a portion thereof,
that is created for the purpose of reaching an audience that is predominately comprised
of minors, and is not intended for a more general audience comprised of adults.”).
178. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). See also supra Part II.C.2.
179. “[P]rimarily comprised of minors” would not include Facebook or Twitter
because there are more adult users, yet it seems that these were the type of sites that were
aimed at. Similarly, YouTube has videos that could be classified as “directed to minors”
but the same cannot be said of the entire site. See Statement of Llansó, supra note 22.
180. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012).
181. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
182. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2500-01.
183. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22580(f) (West 2014).
184. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012) (“any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server”).
185. BUS. & PROF. § 22580(e).
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Though much of the CDA was struck down by the Supreme Court,
§ 230’s immunity for website operators has remained intact.186 This
immunity would shield any imposition of liability upon website or
mobile application operators. Section 230 was enacted to ensure that
the Internet could continue to grow without burdensome restrictions,
like SB 568. In its simplest form, “[t]he message to website operators is
clear: If you don’t encourage illegal content, or design your website to
require users to input illegal content, you will be immune.”187
The advertising provisions of SB 568 thus are likely expressly preempted by § 230(e)(3) because levying punishment against website
operators would be to hold them responsible for the advertisements of
third parties.188 This is factually identical to the Backpage.com cases,
where the state statutes at issue attempted to impose liability by treating
the website operators as speakers.189 Section 230 was implemented to
encourage self-policing by operators, but as the court in McKenna
noted, a state statute with a knowledge requirement “creates an incentive for online service providers not to monitor the content that passes
through its channels. This was precisely the situation that the CDA was
enacted to remedy.”190 The eraser law contains a similar knowledge
requirement, and to enforce SB 568 would be to upset the “unique balance” created by Congress with respect to third party liability online.191
2. Existing Federal Children’s Privacy Laws
In addition to dormant Commerce Clause concerns,192 protecting
children online is an area where the federal interest is “so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of
state laws on the same subject.”193 A state attempting to require an
eraser law or prohibit types of advertising is certainly cognizant of federal attempts to protect children through the CDA, COPA, COPPA,
CIPA, and proposed DNTK. The careful regulatory structure that these
laws have sought has attempted to create a balance between protecting
children and constitutional concerns. When Congress sought comment from the FTC regarding whether COPPA should be expanded to
all under the age of eighteen, the FTC did not believe it would be effective because of circumvention of age verification and the difficulty of
186. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
187. Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008).
188. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“[N]o liability may be imposed under any State or local
law that is inconsistent with this section.”).
189. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805; Hoffman, 2013 WL
4502097.
190. 881 F. Supp. 2d. at 1273. See also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (“Like the strict liability
imposed by the Stratton Oakmont court, liability upon notice reinforces service providers’
incentives to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation.”).
191. Cf. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d. at 1274.
192. See supra Part III.A.
193. Cf. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501.
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distinguishing what is directed to children versus adults.194 Allowing
SB 568 or any other state law that attempts to regulate the behavior of
minors and their relationship with website operators online would disrupt this delicate balance which has continued to evolve over the past
fifteen years.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A. Federal Regulation?
The Internet has evolved substantially since Congress has enacted
any major Internet legislation aimed towards children, the most recent
being COPPA in 1998. Several statistics identified by the Census
Bureau illustrate how far this evolution has come. The percentage of
households with Internet access has increased from 18.0% just before
COPPA,195 to 71% today.196 Additionally, usage by children has nearly
doubled in every age group, most notably in statistics regarding daily
usage, with 50% of children aged six to nine and 67% of eight year olds
logging on.197 The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (“NTIA”) has noted that 98% of Americans live in areas
where broadband service is available, of whom 69% take advantage.198
Mobile broadband speeds have also risen and more Americans own an
Internet-capable smartphone than a traditional mobile device.199
Social networking sites like Facebook have benefitted greatly from the
availability of high-speed Internet, and its record numbers of users continues to grow.200 It was in response to these usage statistics that the
194. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 59 (2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-re
port-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacy
report.pdf.
195. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED
STATES: AUGUST 2000, Fig. 1 (Sept. 2001); see also STATE OF MD, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN.,
REPORT OF THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY (2013).
196. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED
STATES, Fig. 1 (May 2013).
197. AVIVA LUCAS GUTNICK ET AL, SESAME WORKSHOP, ALWAYS CONNECTED: THE DIGITAL MEDIA HABITS OF YOUNG CHILDREN, 16, 30 (2011), available at http://www.joanganzcooneycenter.org/wp- content/uploads/2011/03/jgcc_alwaysconnected.pdf. See also
STATE OF MD, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., REPORT OF THE CHILDREN’S ONLINE PRIVACY 1
(2013). The Census Bureau has identified that 83.2% of children between ages three and
seventeen live in a home with a computer. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOME COMPUTERS AND
INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES, Fig. 1 (May 2013).
198. NAT’L TELECOMM. AND INFO. ADMIN. ET AL., EXPLORING THE DIGITAL NATION:
AMERICA’S EMERGING ONLINE EXPERIENCE 1–2 (2013).
199. Id. at 1 (46% of Americans have a smartphone, while 41% have a traditional
mobile phone).
200. Facebook has 1.23 billion monthly active users, of whom, 757 million log on
daily and 556 million log on with their smartphone. Ami Sedghi, Facebook: 10 Years of
Social Networking, in Numbers, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://www.theguar
dian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/04/facebook-in-numbers-statistics. Perhaps the
most remarkable statistic regarding the dominant force in social networking, is that 73%
of those aged twelve to seventeen use the site. Facebook continues to strengthen its
brand, purchasing the popular messaging application WhatsApp for $19 billon,

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-1\NDE109.txt

296

unknown

Seq: 26

20-APR-15

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

14:49

[Vol. 29

California legislature acted in passing the advertising restriction and
eraser law.
For better or worse, Congress passes fewer laws regulating the
Internet than the states.201 The current landscape of Internet law both
explains and promotes innovation.202 Even for companies like Google
or Facebook, it can be nearly impossible to track every state legislature
for laws that may greatly affect them; this problem is exacerbated for
start-ups.203 Conversely, federal laws pass through extensive lobbying
processes, making it more difficult to pass bad laws, and receiving
meaningful comments on those that are enacted.204
Given that there seems to be no consensus as to the best way to
protect minors online, federal legislation may not come to fruition. At
times, it is even the people themselves who voice opinions over bad
proposed legislation.205 Another potential problem with using the federal government as the proper legislator of online privacy is a potential
lack of trust by the public.206
B. Global Regulation207
Global regulation of the Internet would be ideal to operators
because there would be no question regarding applicable legal conventions. However, widespread laws are likely impossible. Problems facing
children online are not unique to the United States, and part of social
networks’ allure is that they are able to span and connect users across
Instagram for $1 billion (150 million users, 70% of whom log on daily), and has
attempted to purchase SnapChat for $3 billion. Adam Hartung, Three Smart Lessons From
Facebook’s Purchase of WhatsApp, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2014, 4:27 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/adamhartung/2014/02/24/zuckerbergs-3-smart-leadership-lessons-from-facebookbuying-whatsapp/.
201. See Goldman, supra note 151 at 5.
202. Id.
203. Id. Though state legislatures do pass laws that benefit society, there are other
concerns. For example, some may fault Congress for deadlock, but in the states the problem is the converse—both branches of government belong to the same party, perhaps
making it too easy to enact legislation without significant dialogue. In a study by University of Chicago Professor Boris Shor and Princeton University Professor Nolan McCarty,
they found California to be the most polarized state. Niraj Chokshi, Think Congress is
Polarized? Half the States are Worse, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/01/15/think-congress-is-polarized-half-the-states-areworse/.
204. See Goldman, supra note 151, at 6.
205. See, e.g., Amy Goodman, The Sopa Blackout Protest Makes History, THE GUARDIAN
(Jan. 18, 2012, 6:51 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/
2012/jan/18/sopa-blackout-protest-makes-history (detailing the proposed Stop Online
Piracy and Protect IP Acts, which would have made it more difficult for websites to sell or
distribute pirated material, but online petitions and blackouts by websites killed the laws).
206. Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/fallout-fromsnowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html (spying by the federal government
of American. citizens has created an environment of mistrust surrounding the NSA).
207. Full exploration of the issues regarding global regulation of the Internet is
beyond the scope of this Note. For a more full theoretical discussion of global Internet
law see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); see also Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 52.
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national borders.208 What may be considered harmful changes based
on cultural norms, as does the level of access available to the
Internet.209 Thus, current Director of the Intellectual Property Division of the World Economic Forum, Antony Taubman, was most likely
right that the “the Internet will transform international governance
more than international institutions will transform the Internet.”210
C. Self-Regulation
Self-regulation by both parents and website operators is the best
option from both a practical and efficiency viewpoint. Any governmental solution regarding privacy is difficult to tailor because individuals
have differing views.211 This divergence is likely to be exacerbated
because parents may have differing views over what they believe to be
the proper regulation for their children, which wouldn’t necessarily
align with their beliefs about their own privacy. Further, children
would receive far less autonomy over what they were able to do online.
Some sites like Twitter provide specific guidance to teenagers regarding
proper online etiquette.212
The best solution to protecting the scarlet letter into adulthood
that an unfortunate social media post can cause is education on multiple levels. First, CIPA created Internet education requirements, which
should be expanded and upgraded for social media. Second, website
operators should follow the lead of sites like Twitter and provide clear
guidelines for teenagers. Though age verification does not always work,
if signup procedures included this information and perhaps even
required a quiz, teens would not simply click through terms of service.
Finally, no amount of regulation or self-policing will ever be more effective than proper parental guidance. Traditional ways that parents controlled their teens on the Internet have been seriously limited because
of mobile devices, but setting proper boundaries and explaining the
ramifications of becoming a viral story would greatly benefit the protection of children online.
D. Is Legislation Really Necessary?
Whether by eraser buttons, advertising bans, do not track legislation, or some other form, children deserve the right to protection from
themselves and others. However, as many commenters and legislators
call for, there is no substitute for education of minors on proper
208. See generally Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807 (2012).
209. EVA LIEVENS, PROTECTING CHILDREN IN THE DIGITAL ERA: THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS, 499 (2010).
210. Antony Taubman, International Governance and the Internet, in LAW AND THE
INTERNET 3, 43 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 2009).
211. See Rueben Rodrigues, Privacy on Social Networks: Norms, Markets, and Natural
Monopoly, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 237, 246 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 2010).
212. Teens, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/groups/57-safety-security/topics/
265-tips/articles/20169990-safety-tips-for-teens (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
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Internet etiquette.213 One of the biggest practical faults that Professor
Goldman points to in SB 568’s eraser law is that it gives children the
illusion of control.214 This illusion of control does not curtail youthful
indiscretion, and some commenters actually suggest that it should not
be curtailed, but rather, “[w]e should not yield youthfulness to the merciless memory of digital recorders.”215 Professor Chander suggests that
at the very least, youths need a public disclosure right of action.216 He
best summarizes the need to protect children online as “striv[ing] to
give youth a measure of decisional privacy.”217
CONCLUSION
It is hard to disagree with President Kennedy that children are our
most valuable resource. As such, they deserve protection online comparable to what they receive in the physical world. Legislation failing to
reach its stated purpose is not a new phenomenon, but well-intentioned
states’ attempts to protect children online are best described by Professor Goldman as misguided.218 Legislation of the Internet that affects
interstate commerce belongs solely to Congress, and when states like
California, Maryland, and New Jersey attempt to exert control, it sets a
dangerous precedent of a state patchwork of differing regulations. Protecting children online is an important goal, but not to the detriment
of the deeply held American ideals, namely federalism and the freedom
of speech.

213. Id.
214. See Goldman, supra note 3.
215. Anupam Chander, Youthful Indiscretion in the Internet Age, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET 124, 126 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
216. Id. at 138. Professor Chander refers generally to youthful indiscretion in the
Internet age and specifically discusses the increased harm of nude images.
217. Id. at 139.
218. See Goldman, supra note 3.
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